ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Roadway congestion is a source of enormous economic costs. In principle, many of these costs can be prevented because they result from socially inefficient choices made by individuals. Traffic congestion has been alleviated in a number of regions by introducing congestion pricing. Indeed, road pricing has become one of the priorities on transport policy agendas all over the world. It is increasingly believed that road pricing may offer an effective instrument to manage travel demand, and to raise revenues that may for instance be used for transport improvements. In recent years, more and more pricing schemes have been proposed, tested or implemented worldwide [1] .
In the research of congestion pricing, the conventional user equilibrium models suppose that all travellers have the same value of time (VOT), i.e., the road network users are homogenous. In the case of homogeneous users, the theory of marginal cost pricing has well been established in general traffic networks. In line with this theory, various investigations have been conducted on how this classical economic principle would work in a general road network with queuing [2] or in a stochastic network [3] . However, because of the difference in income levels, the network users generally have different VOTs and different preferences on travel choices. Therefore, in travel behaviour modelling and analyses, user heterogeneity has to be considered.
The network disutility can be measured in travel time or travel cost. It is obvious that different system optimal (SO) flow patterns will be obtained if we use different units (time or money) to measure the system disutility. There exists a transformation relationship between time disutility and cost disutility due to VOTs.
In the presence of user heterogeneity, various equilibrium traffic assignment models have been formulated in different ways. The deterministic formulae with discrete VOTs were developed by, for example, Leurent [4] , Mayet and Hansen [5] , Nagurney [6, 7] . The optimal pricing problem for heterogeneous users with continuous VOTs was studied by Dial [8, 9] . The multi-criteria or cost-versus-time network equilibrium and the system optimum problem in a network with a discrete set of VOT user classes were examined by Yang and Huang [10] . They proved that there exists a uniform link toll scheme that supports a cost-based system optimum as a multi-class user equilibrium (UE) flow pattern.
In some networks, there are oligopoly CournotNash (CN) firms. Users in a CN firm can collaborate together for minimizing the total cost of the firm and then compete against others. Zhang, Yang and Huang [11] examined such a UE-CN mixed equilibrium. They showed that in a network with both UE and CN users, applying the conventional marginal-cost pricing in order to reach a system optimum requires all link tolls be differentiated across user classes. Yu and Huang investigated the upper bound of the efficiency loss of such UE-CN mixed equilibrium when all link cost functions are polynomial [12] .
Recently, Guo and Yang [13] have proven that any Pareto optimum can be decentralized into multi-class user equilibrium by using positive anonymous link tolls in the fixed demand network with discrete VOTs. They further bounded the system performance gap when optimized by two different criteria. For an elastic demand network with discrete VOTs, Clark et al. showed that there also exists anonymous link toll scheme which can decentralize the cost-based SO flows to UE flows [14] . Wang and Huang showed that any Pareto optimum, except the time-based one, can be decentralized into a multi-class user equilibrium by a pricing scheme with positive anonymous tolls on all links in the networks with discrete VOTs and elastic demand [15] .
In this paper, a new model has been developed in which two criteria for system optimization are taken into account simultaneously through expressing the welfare functions in either monetary or time units. The VOT is a continuous distribution among a population of commuters and the travel demand is elastic. In Sections 2 and 3, the network equilibrium and the system optimum are formulated, each in time and monetary units, respectively. Then, the equivalent conditions between user equilibrium flow pattern and system optimum flow pattern are derived. Section 4 presents a biobjective system optimization model which minimizes the system time and system cost simultaneously. The existence of anonymous link tolls which can drive the Pareto optimum to a UE solution is investigated. Section 5 concludes the paper.
TIME-BASED AND COST-BASED EQUILIBRIA
Let , G V A =^h be a graph, where V is a set of nodes and A a set of arcs. This graph can be taken to represent a transportation network where nodes are the intersections and arcs are the links between intersections. In this network, there is a set of origin-destination (OD) pairs, W, and a set of paths, R, connecting OD pairs. All network users differ by the value of times (VOTs) and the probability distribution of VOT value, b , across users is defined by a function of distribution:
Let the considered population be ordered in a decreasing order of their VOTs and v b^h be the VOT of the v th user. We assume v 0 2 b^h is continuous and differentiable function on its domain of definition and v 0 1 bl^h , although it is in fact a discrete probability space. From this definition, we have
where N is the total number of considered users. The travel demand qw from an origin to a destination is a function of the travel time between OD pair w W ! . This travel demand function is assumed to be invertible. Let X denote the feasible set of all path flows, , : Generally, the flow pattern under the system optimum is different from the UE flow pattern because each user in UE makes the decision of path choice only to minimize the private travel cost rather than the social cost. This says that all users in UE do not consider the influence of their decisions on the whole system. Thus, congestion pricing is introduced to guide the people's behaviour for implementing a SO flow pattern in a UE manner.
When all users are assigned onto links, we still assume that the VOT function of link flows is continuously distributed. Let 
where ua is the toll charged on link a. In this study, only the anonymous and non-negative link tolls have been considered, because the negative and discriminative link tolls are difficult to implement in reality. The generalized cost of the v th user on path r between OD pair w can also be given in monetary unit, i.e., 
Let , , u u a T g g =^h be the vector of all link tolls.
Under the scheme of charging all link users, the time-based user equilibrium (TUE) with elastic demand is the solution of the following optimization problem: are differentiable and monotonic. Hence, the following properties are tenable:
Therefore, the objective function , Z f q h is strictly convex with respect to link flow vector
, and OD demand vector q. Then, the solution of link flow and OD demand is unique at the equilibrium state in time unit. Note that the objective function is not strictly convex subject to path flow f, so the solution of path flow is not unique.
The cost-based (or monetary-based) user equilibrium (CUE) with elastic demand can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
The first-order optimality conditions of the problem (6), or the equilibrium conditions of the CUE are as follows: 
Thus, the solution of link flow and OD demand is also unique at the equilibrium state in monetary unit.
SYSTEM OPTIMA
First, the cost-based (or monetary-based) system optimum (CSO) was formulated:
where , C f q h is the system travel disutility measured in monetary unit, which equals the total social cost of travelling minus the total user benefit from travelling.
The first-order optimality conditions of the program (8) are as follows: Theorem 1 There exists a link tolling scheme u to decentralize the cost-based system optimum flow pattern into a user equilibrium link flow pattern in cost unit. 4 Note that the link toll can be rewritten as
is the externality measured in time unit. The externality is the additional travel time that a marginal user imposes on other users who have already travelled on link a A ! . This externality is identical for all users. 4. BI-CRITERIA PARETO SYSTEM OPTIMUM As mentioned before, both system time and system cost can be used to measure the system performance. Nevertheless, previous studies on network pricing typically consider only the minimization of either system time T or system cost C, or study the minimization of T and C simultaneously but with fixed demand. In this paper, we propose a bi-objective minimization problem with elastic demand, which combines the two SO problems (8) and (10) together. Instead of seeking optimal flow patterns of minimizing total system time or total system cost, this bi-objective problem is to seek a Pareto optimal solution set. At each point of the Pareto optimal solution set, neither T nor C can be further reduced without increasing the other one. We have tried to find a non-negative link tolling scheme which can decentralize a Pareto SO flow pattern into the UE state. The bi-objective minimization problem is plier of the constraint. Because ,
CONCLUSION
In reality, the users having different VOTs in a traffic network are willing to experience different travel burdens, that is, the users are inclined to minimize either individual travel cost or individual travel time. Meanwhile, the government would like to maximize the system total social welfare or minimize the system total travel cost. Hence, the system performance can be measured either in time unit or in cost unit. They are two significantly different criteria for evaluation. These two criteria are in general mutually inconsistent with each other. This paper provided a theoretical investigation of the multi-criteria traffic assignment, including the costversus-time network equilibrium and system optimum in a network with continuous VOT distribution and elastic demand. We have formulated the user equilibrium and system optimum each in time unit and monetary unit. We have proven the existence of link tolling schemes that can decentralize an SO link flow pattern into the UE link flow pattern in two different criteria, respectively. Under the monetary criterion, the link toll is equal to the average VOT of all users traversing that link multiplied by the travel time externality. On the other hand, when the system disutility is measured in time unit, the link toll is the product of the travel time externality and the VOT of a marginal user.
Furthermore, a bi-objective model has been developed to minimize the system travel time and system travel cost simultaneously. We have proven that there exists a pricing scheme with non-negative anonymous link tolls which can decentralize a Pareto system optimum into user equilibrium. Moreover, the non-negative anonymous link toll can be determined from the Lagrange multiplier of a dual programming problem.
